Statutes and Spokeo:
The Case of the FDCPA
Jason R. Smith†
The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc v Robins clarified the “concreteness” element of the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. The Court explained
that while some statutory violations are concrete injuries, others are merely procedural and insufficient for standing without additional allegations of concrete
harms. Federal courts have divided on the decision’s application to many statutory
causes of action, including the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). While some courts view FDCPA mandatory disclosure violations as concrete injuries if they threaten the plaintiff’s concrete interests, others view the violations as merely procedural and never sufficient for standing. This Comment argues for a third view, that an FDCPA mandatory disclosure
violation is always a concrete injury regardless of whether it causes the plaintiff to
suffer or risk subjective harm. That conclusion flows from a new view: applying
Spokeo to statutory violations turns on whether the provision at issue has a deterrent
or a compensatory function. Because the FDCPA’s text, remedies, statutory purpose,
legislative history, and treatment in other contexts indicate that it is deterrent, violations of its mandatory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries.
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INTRODUCTION
A debt collector sent Paula Casillas a demand to pay a debt.1
The letter disclosed her right to verify the debt under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act2 (FDCPA), but failed to specify that
she had to request verification in writing to avoid waiving her
right.3 That failure violated the statute,4 so Casillas proceeded to
file a class action.5 Casillas and the debt collector resolved their
dispute, jointly moving for class certification and preliminary approval of a settlement.6 But the court threw Casillas’s claim out
soon after. Casillas’s complaint lacked what the court considered
a crucial statement: that the nondisclosure caused her harm.7
The rationale in Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc8
was based on the standing doctrine. In order for a federal court to
hear a case, the plaintiff must show that they have standing.9 The
recent Supreme Court case Spokeo, Inc v Robins10 elaborated on
“injury in fact,” a core component of standing. After Spokeo, an
injury in fact requires an injury that is both concrete and particularized.11 Concrete injuries “must actually exist”; they are “real,
and not abstract.”12 Congress has a role in deciding which injuries
are concrete, but not every statutory cause of action successfully
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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11
12

Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, 926 F3d 329, 332 (7th Cir 2019).
Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1692–92p.
Casillas, 926 F3d at 332.
See 15 USC § 1692g.
Casillas, 926 F3d at 332.
Id.
Id at 331, 334.
926 F3d 329 (7th Cir 2019).
See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–60 (1992).
136 S Ct 1540 (2016).
Id at 1548.
Id (quotation marks omitted).
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creates a concrete injury.13 On the other hand, “[f]or an injury to
be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.’” 14 Thus, Spokeo distinguished concreteness from
particularity—two requirements that the courts often previously
applied as if they were one and the same.15
While the particularity prong has caused few problems, the
application of the concreteness prong to consumer protection statutes remains unclear. In less than four years, Spokeo has caused
a multitude of circuit splits on whether various violations of consumer protection statutes give rise to concrete injuries.16 As a result, defendants should challenge standing whenever plaintiffs
sue for violations of consumer protection statutes.17 The Seventh
Circuit created one of these circuit splits in Casillas by holding
that violations of the mandatory disclosure provisions of the
FDCPA are never concrete injuries if the plaintiff does not allege
an additional harm.18 As a result, Casillas’s failure to allege some
other injury doomed her claim. The Sixth Circuit, in contrast,
treats violations of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure provisions
as concrete injuries in certain cases.19
Resolving how Spokeo applies to the FDCPA is important.
First, the FDCPA is one of America’s most critical consumer protection statutes. It regulates a vast, multibillion-dollar industry
that is notorious for consumer abuse. As such, it generates thousands of lawsuits every year.20 Settling FDCPA standing would
clarify the applicable requirements for practitioners and courts.
Second, and more “concretely,” standing matters to ordinary victims of abusive debt collectors. Tightening standing requirements
13

See id at 1549.
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 560 n 1.
15 See William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 S Ct Rev 197, 215.
16 See Jennifer A. Jackson and Matthew M. Petersen, Spokeo IV: Cert Denied and
the Circuit Splits Left Behind (Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Feb 14, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/ZY7K-3PKV; Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of
Intangible Harms, 118 Mich L Rev 471, 480 (2019) (noting that “[i]n Spokeo’s wake, lower
courts have struggled to adopt a consistent methodology for identifying intangible concrete
injuries across a range of alleged violations of comparable consumer protection laws” and
providing a taxonomy of the failures).
17 See Loren Flath, Note, No Harm, No Foul? How Companies Can Limit their Liability Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes After Spokeo, 46 Rutgers L Rec 125,
144 (2019) (arguing for the use of such a strategy).
18 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 & n 4.
19 See Macy v GC Services Limited Partnership, 897 F3d 747, 761 (6th Cir 2018)
(holding that the defendant’s failure to indicate that disputes must be submitted in writing
was sufficient to create standing for the plaintiffs).
20 See Part I.B.4.
14
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will cause more victims to lose on technicalities like Casillas did.
Because failure to show standing prevents liability, heightening
standing barriers may decrease debt collectors’ incentives to
avoid abuse ex ante. Finally, because this circuit split is one of a
large family of similar splits, solutions to the concreteness question in the FDCPA context could apply analogically to other consumer protection statutes. This Comment proposes and examines
a potential solution to this timely circuit split.
Courts should hold that all violations of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries for purposes of
injury in fact. In other words, plaintiffs need only allege a statutory violation with respect to these provisions, not that they suffered any subjective harm, to establish a concrete injury. For example, plaintiffs need not show that they suffered any financial
loss or mental suffering from the FDCPA violation to have standing. Because of that feature, I refer to this as the “objective solution”
to standing under the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements.
The objective solution to FDCPA mandatory disclosure
standing relies on and illustrates a novel interpretation of how
Spokeo applies to standing when statutes are violated. Under my
“functional” reading of Spokeo, violations of statutes that regulate
industries through deterrence give rise to objective concrete injuries sufficient for standing without subjective harm. On the other
hand, violations of statutes that compensate plaintiffs for subjective injuries are not concrete injuries without a resulting subjective, concrete injury that is also asserted in the complaint. I argue
that this functional framework for evaluating whether statutory
violations are concrete injuries is intuitive and consistent with
both the spirit and text of Spokeo, including its descriptions of
Congress’s role, the purpose of standing, and listed examples.
The functional reading of Spokeo, when applied to the
FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements, leads to the objective approach to standing under them. Because the provisions are
designed to regulate and deter, not to compensate, plaintiffs’
claims arising under them need only assert that the defendant
violated the requirements with respect to the plaintiff to satisfy
Spokeo. The text, structure, and purpose of the FDCPA all
strongly suggest that its mandatory disclosure provisions are regulatory, not compensatory, so all violations of these requirements
should be actionable regardless of whether a subjective injury results. Spokeo instructs the courts to defer to that congressional
judgment. The objective solution also resolves an inconsistency
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between how injury in fact applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory
disclosure and misrepresentation provisions. Finally, the objective approach sets proper incentives for defendants.
The functional reading of Spokeo has utility beyond the
FDCPA. It could provide a way for courts to evaluate standing
under the myriad other consumer protection statutes on which
there are current circuit splits. It also provides Congress clear
guidance on how to design consumer protection statutes to make
violations of them concrete (and how not to do so).
In Part I, I explain standing doctrine and the structure of the
FDCPA. Part II describes the federal courts’ different views on
whether violations of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure provisions are ever concrete injuries. Part III proposes the objective
approach as a solution to the circuit split and explains its merits.
Part III also outlines how standing under other statutes could be
addressed analogously by applying the functional reading of
Spokeo.
I. BACKGROUND: STANDING, SPOKEO, AND THE FDCPA
A. Standing and Spokeo
The US Constitution limits the “judicial Power” to “Cases”
and “Controversies.”21 The standing doctrine arises from that limitation.22 To be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a case
must meet three requirements that form an “irreducible constitutional minimum.”23 First, the plaintiff must show “an injury in
fact,” which is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is
both “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.”24 “Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” so
that the former can be “fairly” traced to the latter.25 Third, it must
be “likely,” not “merely speculative,” that the court could redress
the plaintiff’s injury.26 The standing doctrine protects the separation of powers by ensuring that the courts stick to their proper
domain of cases and controversies.27

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

US Const Art III § 2, cl 1.
See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–60 (1992).
Id at 560.
Id (quotation marks omitted).
Id (quotation marks omitted).
Lujan, 504 US at 561 (quotation marks omitted).
See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1547.
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The injury-in-fact requirement raises a vexing problem: “To
what extent is [the injury-in-fact requirement] shaped by ordinary law, and therefore by Congress, and to what extent is it instead hard-coded in Article III?”28 In other words, what role does
Congress have in determining which injuries are sufficient for
standing, and is there a constitutional constraint on that role?
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on that question was in
two minds before Spokeo. In some cases, statutes created standing for plaintiffs by creating causes of action. In Lujan v Defenders
of Wildlife,29 the Supreme Court said that standing “may exist
solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.” 30 Congress can pass statutes to “elevat[e]
to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”31 In doing so, it
“broaden[s] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support
of standing.”32
However, Lujan is actually an example of the Supreme Court
holding that a statutory violation that Congress explicitly made
sufficient for suit was insufficient to create standing.33 In that
case, the Department of the Interior amended its regulations to
no longer require federal agencies to consult it on impacts to endangered species when acting abroad.34 Various environmentalists sued, seeking an injunction ordering the Department of the
Interior return to the old rule.35 They contended that they had
standing under a provision of the Endangered Species Act allowing “any person” to sue “to enjoin any person, including the
United States” from violating the statute.36
The Court rejected the theory. Even when Congress creates a
cause of action like the one in the Endangered Species Act, plaintiffs suing under it might not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. The statutory violation from the repealed regulation that
the Lujan plaintiffs alleged was a “generally available grievance
about government,” not an injury in fact, so the plaintiffs lacked

28

Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 199 (cited in note 15).
504 US 555 (1992).
30 Id at 578 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Warth v Sedlin,
422 US 490, 500 (1975).
31 Lujan, 504 US at 578.
32 Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 738 (1972).
33 Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 204 (cited in note 15).
34 See Lujan, 504 US at 558–59.
35 Id at 559.
36 Id at 571–72, quoting 16 USC § 1540(g).
29
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standing.37 The Supreme Court criticized the court below for reasoning that “the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by
congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the
procedures required by law.”38 Even when federal courts act “at
the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement,” they violate Article III.39 Lujan therefore clarified that not
all plaintiffs suing under statutory causes of action adequately
allege an injury in fact.
Thus, a hard problem arose in standing doctrine. On the one
hand, Congress could make some injuries concrete by enacting
statutory causes of action. For example, Lujan explicitly did not
apply to statutes that “create[ ] a concrete private interest in the
outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government’s
benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”40
On the other hand, Congress could sometimes fail to create standing even when it attempted to do so, as it did in the Endangered
Species Act. How to classify which statutes succeeded in their attempts to create injury in fact and which failed was a question
with no clear answer.41
The Supreme Court faced this paradox squarely in Spokeo. In
Spokeo, the defendant operated an online search engine for personal information that provided false information about the
named plaintiff, Thomas Robins.42 Robins then sued under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act43 (FCRA), which includes a private
right of action.44 The district court dismissed his complaint for
lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit reversed.45 The Supreme
Court reversed again, faulting the Ninth Circuit for “fail[ing] to

37

Lujan, 504 US at 573.
Id (emphasis in original).
39 Id at 576. See also Summers v Earth Island Institute, 555 US 488, 497 (2009)
(“[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot
be removed by statute.”).
40 Lujan, 504 US at 573.
41 See Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 209 (cited in note 15).
42 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1544.
43 Pub L No 91-508, 84 Stat 1128, codified at 15 USC § 1681 et seq.
44 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1545–46. Note that the FCRA, like the FDCPA, is an
important consumer protection statute that limits the activities of debt collectors. See
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: BCFP Annual
Report 2019 *8 (Mar 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/K9NP-BBY2.
45 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1546.
38
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fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and particularization” in injury in fact.46 The Court described concreteness
in the following way: “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that
is, it must actually exist. When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—
‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ Concreteness, therefore, is quite different
from particularization.”47 On the other hand, “[f]or an injury to be
‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” 48 Showing a violation of the plaintiff’s personal interests is not enough to show concreteness, though.49 Spokeo
harmed Robins personally by providing false information about
him in particular, so particularity was not an issue for Robins’s
case.50
While the Court claimed that it had repeatedly emphasized
the distinction between concreteness and particularity,51 that
claim is dubious.52 In prior decisions, the Court used both words
but often did so interchangeably. The newly emphasized distinction once again raised the question of which statutory causes of
action successfully create concrete injuries. Rather than resolving
the tension that had built up over that question in earlier cases,
though, the Court attempted to have its cake and eat it too.
On the one hand, it emphasized the role of Congress in identifying concrete intangible injuries, such as violations of free
speech or free exercise.53 The Court explained that “[i]n determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both
history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”54
There are two ways to show that an intangible injury is concrete.
The first is to show that the injury has a “close relationship” to a

46

Id at 1550.
Id at 1548 (citations omitted).
48 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 560 n 1.
49 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548.
50 Id at 1550.
51 See id at 1548.
52 Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 215 (cited in note 15) (“The word ‘concrete’ had appeared
in the Court’s standing cases before . . . [b]ut . . . had not before been given any independent definition or meaning.”); Justiciability—Class Action Standing—Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 130 Harv L Rev 437, 444 (2016) (“[Spokeo][ ] . . . is the first Supreme Court case to
pull apart the concreteness and particularization prongs . . . in order to deny standing.”).
53 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549.
54 Id.
47
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harm that was historically actionable at common law.55 The second is to show that the plaintiff’s injury has been identified by
Congress as sufficiently concrete for standing:
[B]ecause Congress is well positioned to identify intangible
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is [ ] instructive and important. Thus, we said in Lujan
that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.” . . . Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case explained that “Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”56
In cases where Congress has defined a new concrete injury,
the plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified” to have standing.57 From the Court’s language, a reasonable reader could infer that the courts should defer to Congress’s creations of causes of action.
However, the Court also made clear that a statutory violation
is not necessarily sufficient for a concrete injury. Plaintiffs do not
“automatically” have concrete injuries “whenever a statute grants
a person a statutory right” and purports to create a cause of action
to remedy its violation.58 “Article III standing requires a concrete
injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”59 In particular,
“bare procedural violation[s]” of statutes that are “divorced from
any concrete harm” are not concrete injuries even if a statute permits plaintiffs to sue in response to them.60 The Court’s example
of a bare procedural injury in the context of the FCRA is that of a
credit reporter reporting an incorrect zip code.61 That being said,
the Court expressly did not decide whether any other violations
of consumer protection statutes are insufficiently concrete without an additional showing of injury.62 It did clarify, though, that
showing a risk of concrete harm, such as those posed by libel,
55 Id. Because modern consumer protection statutes often create causes of action that
are not especially similar to those at common law, such as violations of mandatory disclosure provisions, this is unlikely to be helpful to consumer protection plaintiffs.
56 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (majority), 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
57 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550.
62 Id at 1550 n 8.
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slander, and violations of freedom of information statutes, can be
sufficient without showing an additional injury.63
Thus, the two-sided nature of standing doctrine with regard
to statutory violations continues. Spokeo continued to hold that
Congress has a role in identifying concrete injuries, but also that
not all such identifications succeed. By failing to resolve the
tension in its prior cases, the Court added further confusion in a
decision intended to resolve it. The key questions from before
Spokeo remain: Which statutory causes of action identify concrete
injuries and which do not? How should courts decide? Those problems are particularly vexing in the context of consumer protection
law, the subject of Spokeo itself. Circuits have subsequently split
on the questions of which violations of consumer protection statutes are sufficiently concrete to confer standing.64
B. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
This Comment focuses on the circuit split over the mandatory
disclosure provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a
major federal consumer protection statute. The FDCPA aims to
“eliminate abusive debt collection practices,” protect fair debt collectors from “competitive[ ] disadvantage[ ],” and “promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.”65 Its requirements can be grouped into two major categories: procedural protections for consumers and regulations on
debt collector communications with the public.66 The two categories work together to achieve the statute’s consumer protective
goals: they give consumers rights under the statute and ensure
that consumers know that they can exercise those rights. Neither
the undisclosed ability to exercise rights nor formal disclosures
without accompanying rights help consumers much. The FDCPA
is enforced through both private lawsuits and administrative
remedies. Its private right of action has enabled a great deal of

63 Id at 1549–50, citing Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11, 20–25
(1998), and Public Citizen v Department of Justice, 491 US 440, 449 (1989).
64 These include splits arising under the FDCPA, the FCRA, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, the Video Protection
Privacy Act, and the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See generally Jackson and Petersen,
Spokeo IV: Cert Denied (cited in note 16). The Supreme Court does not appear to feel a
pressing need to resolve them.
65 15 USC § 1692(e).
66 Note that debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA include both natural and legal
“person[s].” See 15 USC § 1692a(6).
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litigation.67 This Comment focuses, in particular, on how Spokeo
applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements, but
comprehending the Act as a whole helps to understand the disclosure requirements.
1. Procedural protections.
The FDCPA provides important procedural protections for
consumers confronted by debt collectors. They include the rights
to dispute a debt and to request the name and address of the original creditor within thirty days after receiving a notice from the
debt collector.68 The right to request information on the original
creditor is important because debts are often transferred between
many creditors, so the consumer might have difficulty verifying
or disputing the debt without it.69 Upon receiving notice that a
consumer is exercising one of those rights, the debt collector must
stop collecting the debt or the disputed portion of it until the collector receives the requested documentation and sends it to the
consumer.70 If the consumer does not make a request within the
thirty-day period, the collector may continue all legal collection
efforts.71
2. Regulations on communications.
The FDCPA also extensively regulates collector-consumer
communications. These restrictions take five main forms: mandatory disclosures, bans on misrepresentations, bans on unfair practices, protections of debtor privacy, and restrictions on the scope
of the debt collector’s communications with the debtor.
This Comment focuses on standing under the FDCPA’s two
major mandatory disclosure provisions. First, 15 USC § 1692e(11)
requires the debt collector to disclose that it is a debt collector in
all communications with the consumer, with the exception of legal
pleadings.72 In the first communication, the debt collector must
also disclose “that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt

67

See Part I.B.4.
15 USC § 1692g(a).
69 See Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of
Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 Loyola Consumer L Rev 355, 359–60 (2012).
70 15 USC § 1692g(b).
71 15 USC § 1692g(b).
72 15 USC § 1692e(11).
68
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and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”73 Second, within five days of the initial communication with
a consumer, the debt collector must send a “notice of debt” which
includes more extensive disclosures of information and rights under § 1692g(a). These include the amount of the debt, the name of
the creditor, that the debt will be presumed valid unless the consumer disputes it in writing within thirty days, and the rights to
dispute the debt or request the name and address of the creditor
in writing within thirty days.74 If a consumer does not receive the
notice and subsequently follow the prescribed procedures, they
may accidentally waive the right to dispute the debt or receive
creditor information.75
Aside from mandatory disclosures, the FDCPA prohibits
broadly defined categories of abusive debt collection practices.
These include “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means” for debt collection, including more than a dozen specific, nonexhaustive examples.76 The FDCPA also bans “conduct
the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse
any person in connection with the collection of a debt”77 and “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
debt,” again with a list of specific, nonexhaustive examples.78
Other provisions of the FDCPA attempt to prevent debt collectors from humiliating consumers by communicating with third
parties. For example, debt collectors may only communicate with
the consumer, the creditor, and the attorneys of the parties involved except to find location information.79

73

15 USC § 1692e(11).
15 USC § 1692g(a).
75 See, for example, Casillas, 926 F3d at 341 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[P]eople might not appreciate the need for a written record of their dealings
with the debt collector and thus without a reminder that they must reduce their concerns
to writing, they are likely to forfeit the important substantive rights the Act provides for
them.”).
76 15 USC § 1692e.
77 15 USC § 1692d.
78 15 USC § 1692f.
79 See 15 USC § 1692c(b), incorporating by reference 15 USC § 1692b. Location information means “a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or
his place of employment.” 15 USC § 1692a(7). A debt collector contacting someone besides
the consumer to discover the location information must “identify himself, state that he is
confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer.” 15 USC § 1692b(1). The collector may not reveal
that the consumer owes any debt or send written materials indicating that it is a debt
collector. See 15 USC § 1692b(2)–(5).
74
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Finally, the Act prevents debt collectors from contacting consumers at all in certain circumstances unless they have permission to do so. For example, there is a presumption that collectors
cannot contact consumers at inconvenient times or after the consumer requests that the collector stop, subject to enumerated
exceptions.80
3. Remedies.
Violations of the rights granted under the FDCPA can be
remedied either through private action or administrative enforcement. First, the FDCPA creates a private right of action. Actual
damages sustained by a plaintiff can be collected in all lawsuits.81
Other damages can be added to actual damages at the court’s discretion.82 In individual actions, the plaintiff can collect discretionary statutory damages of up to $1,000.83 In class actions, named
plaintiffs can recover statutory damages of up to $1,000, and all
other class members can collectively recover up to the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 percent of the debt collector’s net worth.84 When
judging discretionary liability in class actions, courts consider
“the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt
collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional.”85 Moreover, successful plaintiffs in any FDCPA action
have the right to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.86 In all
FDCPA actions, an affirmative defense exists if the debt collector
shows that the violation was unintentional and happened notwithstanding reasonable error prevention procedures.87
In addition to the private right of action, the FDCPA provides
various administrative remedies. All violations of the FDCPA not
committed to the jurisdiction of other agencies are deemed violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act88 (FTC Act), so the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the FDCPA.89 All of
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See 15 USC § 1692c(a)(1), (c).
See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(1).
See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2).
15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(B).
15 USC § 1692k(b)(2).
See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(3).
See 15 USC § 1692k(c).
Pub L No 63-203, 38 Stat 717 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 41 et seq.
See 15 USC § 1692l(a).
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the FTC’s powers under the FTC Act may be used in FDCPA enforcement.90 Moreover, all violations of the FDCPA may be pursued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).91 In
some specific contexts, the FDCPA is also enforced by federal
banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, the
Department of Transportation, and the Department of
Agriculture.92
4. FDCPA litigation.
The FDCPA’s private right of action has led to a great deal of
civil litigation. Debt collection is a multibillion-dollar industry in
the United States.93 Third-party debt collectors are attempting to
collect from roughly 28 percent of American consumers with a
credit file.94 The average consumer contacted by at least one debt
collector has more than three debts being pursued.95 Debt collection typically begins with a creditor giving up on collecting a delinquent payment, at which point it hires a third-party debt collector who works on contingency.96 If the debt collector is
unsuccessful in collecting, the debt will be sold to a debt buyer at
a heavy discount.97 Debt buyers can then sell the debt on to other
debt buyers, and so on and so forth.98 Even the debt buying market is now very large; the FTC found that nine debt buyers spent
nearly $6.5 billion buying debt with a face value of almost $143
billion in 2008.99
Unsurprisingly, not all of those debt collectors treat consumers well. Debt collection is the most common source of consumer
complaints to both the FTC and the CFPB.100 There are serious

90

See 15 USC § 1692l(a).
See 15 USC § 1692l(b)(6).
92 See 15 USC § 1692l(b).
93 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:
BCFP Annual Report 2019 at *8 (cited in note 44).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Fox, 24 Loyola Consumer L Rev at 358–59 (cited in note 69).
97 See id at 359.
98 Id at 359–60.
99 Federal Trade Commission, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry *8 (Jan 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/4PPM-7SAJ.
100 National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Debt Collection Facts *1 (Feb 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/2YJ2-VPE8.
91
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questions over whether the FDCPA is currently capable of curbing widespread abuse by debt collectors.101
The FDCPA created a perfect storm for large-scale class action litigation. It has a private right of action with significant statutory damages and is aimed at a deep-pocketed industry that targets consumers by the thousands. As a result, FDCPA litigation
has increased significantly over the last two decades, and around
ten thousand lawsuits under the FDCPA are filed annually.102
Because private FDCPA litigation is a major regulator of the
debt collection industry, and because all plaintiffs must show
standing, either relaxing or tightening standing requirements
significantly would affect debt collectors’ potential liability. As a
result, changes in standing requirements would likely lead to
changes in debt collectors’ conduct. Resolving disagreements on
standing under the FDCPA is thus important not only for justiciability doctrine but also for consumer protection efforts.
Moreover, while I focus on standing under the mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA, a successful solution to that issue could be applied analogously to the circuit splits involving
other consumer protection statutes. In this way, it would contribute to solving the current problems that arise from the intersection of consumer protection laws and Spokeo.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuit courts are currently divided on how to apply
Spokeo to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
FDCPA—specifically, whether nondisclosures can be concrete injuries without more. The Seventh Circuit recognized that its opinion in Casillas created a split with the Sixth Circuit by ruling in
the opposite direction on materially identical facts.103 In this Part,
I explain the arguments on each side of this split. The Sixth Circuit holds that the FDCPA makes nondisclosure alone a concrete
injury in some circumstances, while the Seventh Circuit holds
that without more, it never is.104
101 See Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection After FDCPA, 79 S Cal L Rev 711, 729 (2006) (alleging that the FDCPA simply
forced collectors to find a new business model to continue harassing consumers).
102 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB
Annual Report 2016 *15 (Mar 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/PQ4V-8VMC.
103 Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 & n 4. See also id at 340 (Wood dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
104 The circuit split has a third side: the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in
Church v Accretive Health, Inc, 654 F Appx 990 (11th Cir 2016). Church analogizes the
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A. The Sixth Circuit’s View: Nondisclosure Is (Sometimes) a
Concrete Injury
The Sixth Circuit faced the problem of how to reconcile
Spokeo and the FDCPA in Macy v GC Services Limited Partnership.105 The plaintiffs, Wilbur Macy and Pamela Stowe, alleged
that a letter sent from the defendant debt collector failed to disclose that individuals must dispute debts in writing to assert their
rights under the FDCPA, violating the FDCPA’s disclosure requirements.106 To determine whether the violation was a concrete
injury, the court began by analyzing Spokeo. It pointed to the language in Spokeo indicating that plaintiffs need not allege additional harm when statutory violations are sufficient for injury in
fact.107 It recognized, though, that Spokeo also clarified that not
all statutory violations are sufficient for injury in fact without additional allegations of harm.108
The court’s solution to this now-familiar dilemma was to focus on whether Congress created the procedural right to protect

FDCPA disclosure issue to Havens Realty Corp v Coleman, 455 US 363 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had standing to sue a landlord that falsely said it
had no apartments available for her but told a prospective white renter that units were
available, violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Church, 654 F Appx at 993–94, citing
Havens Realty, 455 US at 368, 372–73. The FHA creates an enforceable right to truthful
information, and violations of it are injuries in fact sufficient for standing without additional allegations. See Church, 654 F Appx at 994, citing Havens Realty, 455 US at 373–
74. The Eleventh Circuit extended Havens Realty to the FDCPA, claiming that the FDCPA
created an enforceable right to receive information through mandatory disclosures and
that violations of it from nondisclosure are sufficient for standing. See Church, 654 F Appx
at 994–95.
However, Church did not seriously grapple with Spokeo, which makes clear that not
all violations of statutory rights are sufficient to create standing. The Eleventh Circuit
itself seemingly rejected Church’s rationale in a different context. See Nicklaw v CitiMortgage, Inc, 839 F3d 998, 1002–03 (11th Cir 2016). See also Lyshe v Levy, 854 F3d 855, 859–
60 (6th Cir 2017) (explaining the tension between the Eleventh Circuit cases). Moreover,
unlike the FDCPA, the FHA only creates private rights of action for failures to disclose on
the basis of protected characteristics; the injury in an FHA case is discrimination related
in a way that the injury in an FDCPA case is not. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 338. Both the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits have explicitly rejected Church. See Lyshe, 854 F3d at 859–
61; Casillas, 926 F3d at 338, 338–39 n 7. Because this does not appear to be a probable
route taken by the courts in the future, I do not address it in detail. The idea that any
statutory cause of action is sufficient for a concrete injury is an unpromising reading of
both Havens Realty and Spokeo.
105 897 F3d 747 (6th Cir 2018).
106 Id at 751.
107 Id at 753, citing Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548–49.
108 Macy, 897 F3d at 754.
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a concrete interest and whether the violation threatened that concrete interest.109 This approach borrows from widely cited decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits.110 As the court summarized:
Spokeo categorized statutory violations as falling into two
broad categories: (1) where the violation of a procedural right
granted by statute is sufficient in and of itself to constitute
concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and the
procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to
that concrete interest; and (2) where there is a ‘‘bare’’ procedural violation that does not meet this standard, in which
case a plaintiff must allege “additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified.”111
The Second Circuit’s rationale for adopting this test stemmed
from a line in Summers v Earth Island Institute,112 quoting Lujan,
that the court determined was still good law.113 “Only a ‘person
who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.’” 114 However,
whether that line can support the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of Spokeo is at least questionable.115

109 See id at 754–55, citing Strubel v Comenity Bank, 842 F3d 181, 189 (2d Cir 2016),
and Robins v Spokeo, Inc, 867 F3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir 2017) (Spokeo II).
110 See Strubel, 842 F3d at 189 (discussing the scope of “bare procedural violation[s]”
as applied to the Truth in Lending Act); Spokeo II, 867 F3d at 1113–14 (assessing rights
created by the FCRA). Note that neither Strubel nor Spokeo II involved the FDCPA, so
they are not part of the split that is the main topic of this Comment.
111 Macy, 897 F3d at 756, quoting Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original).
112 555 US 488 (2009).
113 See Strubel, 842 F3d at 189, quoting Summers, 555 US at 496.
114 Summers, 555 US at 496, quoting Lujan, 555 US at 572 n 7 (emphasis omitted).
115 There are several issues with the Second Circuit’s extrapolation from this sentence. First, the language in Summers and Lujan preceded the development of the clear
distinction between concreteness and particularity that created the issues this Comment
is concerned with.
Second, in both Summers and Lujan, the language discusses the plaintiffs’ supposed
procedural right to force the government follow its own procedures, which bears little resemblance beyond the term “procedural” to rights granted in the causes of action of consumer protection statutes. See Summers, 555 US at 496–97; Lujan, 504 US at 572.
Third, and most importantly, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote concurrences for the
majority-makers in both Lujan and Summers that limit the exact text that the Second
Circuit cites. For Justice Kennedy, each “case would present different considerations if
Congress . . . provide[d] redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before,’” Summers, 555 US at 501 (Kennedy concurring), quoting
Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), exer-
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The questions facing the Sixth Circuit thus became whether
Congress created the right to disclosure in the FDCPA to protect
a concrete interest of consumers and whether the defendant
threatened that interest. The Sixth Circuit answered yes to both
in Macy. Section 1692g(a)(4)’s requirement for debt collectors to
disclose that debts must be disputed in writing aims to allow debtors to enforce and understand their rights.116 In particular, nondisclosure creates a risk of concrete harm from the “possibility of
an unintentional waiver of FDCPA’s debt-validation rights, including suspension of collection of disputed debts under Section 1692g(b).”117 The debt collector’s failure to disclose in the particular case allegedly threatened Macy and Stowe’s interest in
avoiding waiver.118 It follows that Macy and Stowe had standing.119
Under the Sixth Circuit’s approach, not all violations of statutory rights are sufficient for concrete injuries, so the approach
complies with Spokeo. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that
nondisclosure in violation of the FCRA was insufficient for standing without additional harm because violations of the disclosure
requirements of the FCRA create far smaller risks of harm than
analogous violations of the FDCPA.120

cising “the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation” that are newly sufficient for standing, Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). See also Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comment, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 Duke L J 1170, 1173,
1181 (1993) (explaining the failure of much of Lujan to get majority support and the concurrence’s approval of broad congressional power to create causes of action); Maria Banda,
Case Comment, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 34 Harv Envir L Rev 321, 328 (2010)
(“Justice Kennedy broke the tie in Summers . . . by reaffirming his Lujan concurrence that
Congress must retain enough flexibility to define new injuries.”). The test adopted by the
Second Circuit, though, plausibly violates this understanding for two reasons. The first is
that it provides no space for Congress to identify new concrete interests. The second is
that it requires courts to investigate whether the facts in particular cases threaten the
concrete interest Congress identified. That eliminates Congress’s power to identify statutory violations that are sufficient alone for standing, which is exactly what Justice Kennedy called to preserve.
116 See Macy, 897 F3d at 758.
117 Id. Chief Judge Diane Wood made a similar argument dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc in the Seventh Circuit’s Casillas decision. She argued that nondisclosure creates a risk of accidental waiver of rights and the inability to stall collection until
the debt is verified, which is a concrete injury sufficient for standing under Spokeo. See
Casillas, 926 F3d at 341–42 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Her argument shows that the FDCPA’s disclosure interests were designed to protect the concrete
interests of consumers, so plaintiffs need not allege any additional harm to have standing.
See id.
118 Macy, 897 F3d at 758.
119 See id at 761.
120 See Huff v TeleCheck Services, Inc, 923 F3d 458, 468 (6th Cir 2019).
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that a different violation of
the FDCPA was a bare procedural violation insufficient for standing. In Hagy v Demers & Adams,121 the plaintiffs fell behind on
payments on their mobile home and asked the creditor to waive
any deficiency balance in return for a deed in lieu of foreclosure.122
The lender agreed and its attorney sent the plaintiffs a letter giving them “everything they wanted.”123 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs
sued because the letter did not disclose that it was from a debt
collector, violating the FDCPA.124 The court held that merely alleging a violation of the identification provision was insufficient
for standing because otherwise Congress would be able to “enact
an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to transform
something that is not remotely harmful into something that is.”125
The Macy court distinguished the case from Hagy on the grounds
that there was no risk of harm in the Hagy case, such as the risk
of double payment, of the type that the mandatory disclosure prevents.126 In other words, Hagy failed the second part of Macy’s
test.
B. The Seventh Circuit: Nondisclosure Is Never a Concrete
Injury
The Seventh Circuit case Casillas involved a factual setup
nearly identical to that in Macy, but the court came to a different
conclusion. As in Macy, the plaintiff received a letter from a debt
collector that violated § 1692g(a)(4) by failing to note that consumers must dispute debts in writing, not orally.127 The court emphasized that Casillas did not allege in her complaint that she
attempted to dispute the debt or planned to attempt to dispute
the debt.128
Writing for the court, Judge Amy Coney Barrett read Spokeo
differently from the Sixth Circuit. She emphasized the parts of
Spokeo that explained that congressionally created causes of action are not necessarily sufficient for standing.129 Yet, Judge Barrett did not cite the language in Spokeo on which the Sixth Circuit
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

882 F3d 616 (6th Cir 2018).
Id at 618–19.
Id at 622.
Id at 620–21.
Hagy, 882 F3d at 622.
Macy, 897 F3d at 761, citing Hagy, 882 F3d at 621–22.
Casillas, 926 F3d at 332.
Id.
See id at 333, citing Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549.
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hung its hat: “[T]hat a ‘violation of a procedural right granted by
statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact,’ and ‘in such a case a plaintiff need not allege any
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” 130 The
result was a one-sided reading of a two-sided decision. Spokeo emphasized both Congress’s role in identifying injuries in fact and
the need for judicial limits on it, but the Seventh Circuit looked
only to the latter. The court held that FDCPA disclosure plaintiffs
must always allege an additional harm or risk of harm from the
debt collector’s violation beyond the statutory violation itself to
have standing.131 Indeed, in dicta, the Seventh Circuit suggested
that this limitation on standing extends to the mandatory disclosure provisions of all consumer protection statutes.132
The court applied this interpretation to the facts to deny
Casillas standing. Because she did not allege that she planned to
dispute the debt in her complaint, she could not have been impeded by the defendant’s failure to disclose. She “was not at any
risk of losing her statutory rights because there was no prospect
that she would have tried to exercise them.”133 The court emphasized that she did not even plead that she read the deficient notice.134 Because the Seventh Circuit requires mandatory disclosure plaintiffs to allege some other concrete harm beyond the
statutory violation, Casillas’s case was dismissed.135
The Seventh Circuit’s requirement does not doom all cases
under the FDCPA. For example, when a debt collector failed to
provide any of the required disclosures, the Seventh Circuit held
that the plaintiff had standing to sue.136 The debtor was concretely
injured by the debt collector suing her without giving her the benefit of the mandatory disclosures, which would have informed her
of rights to dispute and to verify the debt and thereby halt the

130 Macy, 897 F3d at 753, quoting Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (alterations omitted) (emphasis in original).
131 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 333.
132 See id at 332 (“[A] plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing
simply by alleging that the defendant violated a disclosure provision of a consumer-protection statute.”), citing Groshek v Time Warner Cable, Inc, 865 F3d 884, 887 (7th Cir 2017).
133 Casillas, 926 F3d at 334. At least one district court outside of the Seventh Circuit
has ruled similarly on a parallel rationale. See Jackson v Abendroth & Russell, PC, 207 F
Supp 3d 945, 953–57 (SD Iowa 2016).
134 Casillas, 926 F3d at 335.
135 Id at 332–33.
136 See Lavallee v Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 932 F3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir 2019).
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lawsuit.137 Similarly, the Casillas court distinguished the case before it from a FCRA case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation
of a right to review a background report before a prospective employer took adverse action based on it.138 Because the FCRA plaintiff’s employer did not give her a copy of the background check
before firing her, depriving her of the opportunity to respond to
it, the Seventh Circuit held that she was concretely injured. The
Casillas court argued that Casillas could not allege “any comparable lost opportunity.”139 That rationale suggests that a plaintiff
alleging some other injury under the FDCPA involving a lost opportunity—such as a failure to disclose the possibility of disputing
the debt at all—might fare better under the Seventh Circuit’s approach to standing.140
Thus, a circuit split now exists on whether a violation of the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA creates a harm
such that a plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond
the one identified by Congress” in the statute.141 The split’s root
lies in an ambiguity in Spokeo itself: its decision to affirm both
sides of the statutory standing debate created problems identifying which violations of statutorily created rights are sufficient for
standing without allegations of additional harm and which are
not.142 The objective approach to FDCPA standing that I propose
follows from an answer to that deep question that focuses on statutes’ functions.
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT ON CONCRETENESS: THE OBJECTIVE
PERSPECTIVE
In this Part, I advocate a distinct approach to the problem of
standing under the FDCPA’s disclosure requirements that helps
137

See id.
See Casillas, 926 F3d at 334, citing Robertson v Allied Solutions, 902 F3d 690,
693–97 (7th Cir 2018).
139 Casillas, 926 F3d at 334.
140 See Lavallee, 932 F3d at 1053 (holding that the plaintiff had standing when a debt
collector failed to provide any of the required FDCPA disclosures). However, failing to disclose that disputes must be in writing also creates a risk that the plaintiff will be denied
the opportunity to dispute the debt, but the Seventh Circuit held that that was insufficient
for standing. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 341–42 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
141 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original).
142 See John L. Brown and Ron Edwards, No One Left Standing: Hagy v. Demers &
Adams, LLC and Post-Spokeo Standing Under the FDCPA (American Bar Association
Business Law Today, Nov 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7TAN-FB2Q; Baude,
2016 S Ct Rev at 214–16 (cited in note 15).
138
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to resolve the ambiguities that the courts face in the aftermath of
Spokeo. I propose that whenever debt collectors violate the mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA, the affected consumers have standing, because Congress chose to make nondisclosure
a concrete harm regardless of whether the nondisclosure causes
a subjective harm to an individual plaintiff. In other words, the
plaintiff need not show that they personally suffered due to nondisclosure—for example, by being misled, losing an opportunity,
or being financially harmed—in order to have standing in a mandatory disclosure action. I call this the “objective approach” because it does not require the courts to determine whether a plaintiff suffered a subjective injury to determine whether she has a
concrete injury.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s approach, whether a disclosure violation is a concrete injury under the objective framework does
not depend on whether the risk posed by the failure to disclose
was sufficiently grave. Thus, consumers should have standing
even in hard mandatory disclosure cases like Hagy, in which the
risk of subjective harm to the consumer is exceptionally slight.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the objective approach
provides that a violation of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure
provisions is itself a concrete injury and that a consumer suing in
response to it does not need to allege an additional harm.
This solution follows from a broader view of how Spokeo
should be interpreted in cases involving statutory violations. Under this interpretation, when Congress creates a statutory cause
of action to deter industry activity rather than to compensate individuals for their losses, a violation of the statute alone is an objective concrete injury under Spokeo. A plaintiff does not need to
show any additional harm beyond the violation to have standing.
When Congress creates causes of action to compensate individuals for harms they suffer, though, plaintiffs must show a subjective harm beyond the mere fact of the statutory violation to have
standing and obtain compensation. I call this a “functional interpretation” of Spokeo’s application to statutes because it makes the
question of whether a statutory violation is a concrete injury depend on the function of the statutory provision.
The objective approach to FDCPA mandatory disclosure
standing in light of Spokeo has several advantages over alternatives. First, I argue that the functional reading of Spokeo is the
best approach to the case. Spokeo held that Congress can identify
concrete harms but that not all statutes creating causes of action
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do so. The functional approach to Spokeo persuasively shows
which are which.
Second, when the functional approach is applied to the
FDCPA, it becomes clear that all violations of the mandatory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries. The text, structure, and
legislative history of the FDCPA all support the theory that the
mandatory disclosure provisions are deterrent, not compensatory.
Moreover, the objective approach reconciles an inconsistency in
how standing doctrine applies to the FDCPA’s nondisclosure and
misrepresentation provisions. The latter have long been governed
by an objective standard that does not require showing subjective
harm. Finally, the objective approach creates proper incentives
for debt collectors, encouraging them to fulfill their FDCPA obligations and discouraging them from targeting unsophisticated
consumers.
I conclude this Part by showing how courts—when confronted
by similar problems under other consumer protections provisions—can use by analogy the approach to Spokeo exemplified by
the objective view of FDCPA standing. The theory also preserves
Congress’s power by ensuring that it can successfully identify
concrete injuries through legislation.
A. A Functional Reading of Statutory Violations and Spokeo
The objective theory of standing under the FDCPA is fully
consistent with both sides of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Spokeo. Respecting Congress’s decision to make nondisclosure an
actionable injury aligns with Spokeo’s description of Congress’s
role in “elevat[ing] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”143
By creating the rights and remedies of the FDCPA, Congress
made an injury which was not previously legally cognizable—nondisclosure—legally cognizable. As such, plaintiffs alleging illegal
nondisclosure “need not allege any additional harm beyond the
one Congress has identified.”144
Remember, though, that Spokeo also clarified that merely alleging a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm” is insufficient for standing even when a statute makes the
procedural violation actionable.145 Thus, there must be a principle

143
144
145

Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (emphasis in original).
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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that distinguishes nondisclosure under the FDCPA from Spokeo’s
class of insufficiently concrete “bare procedural violations.” My
functional approach to Spokeo provides such a principle.
Under the functional approach, actions forbidden by regulatory causes of action that primarily deter industries rather than
compensate individuals for suffering are concrete injuries. Actions forbidden by compensatory causes of action that make individuals whole for subjective suffering are not necessarily concrete. Plaintiffs suing under such provisions must show an
additional concrete harm beyond the statutory violation to have
standing. My approach thus clarifies which statutory violations
are concrete injuries and which are not.
Some causes of action primarily regulate industries through
deterrence rather than compensate individuals for harm. Congress enlists private individuals to sue to accomplish its end goal
of ensuring that companies comply with federal statutes and regulations.146 While the plaintiff is entitled to money damages, the
role of damages is largely to give the plaintiff an incentive to bring
suit and to deter the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff
for personal harms. Congress sees enhancements to damages beyond the level needed for compensation—such as treble, qui tam,
and statutory damages mechanisms—as necessary to enlist private parties to enforce public regulations.147 For deterrence, not
only is compensation not the goal, but it theoretically does not
matter who the damages go to as long as the defendant is made
to pay.148 The amount of litigation that results might seem wholly
out of proportion to the meager harms caused by violations, but
compensation is not the point.149
Compensatory provisions, though, aim to make plaintiffs
whole for the injuries they suffer due to the defendant’s wrongful

146

See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn L Rev 782, 783–95 (2011).
See id at 791–93.
148 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 78 (Little, Brown 1972) (“[T]hat
the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It is payment by the defendant that creates incentives for more efficient resource use.”) (emphasis
in original); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L J
347, 370 (2003) (“[C]onventional economic opinion has traditionally remained completely
agnostic with respect to the distribution of punitive damages. It has long regarded the
plaintiff’s windfall as a necessary byproduct of adequately deterring the defendant.”) (citation omitted).
149 See, for example, John O’Brien, Phoney Lawsuits: A Federal Law is Giving Litigious People a New Income Stream (Forbes, Mar 14, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/W7B6-C2KD (criticizing the high number and high damages of lawsuits
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
147
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conduct.150 The classic example is, of course, compensatory damages in tort law,151 but examples can be found much further
afield.152 While compensatory statutes deter by providing damages, since the purpose is to compensate the plaintiff, where the
money goes is essential, not incidental.
The functional reading of Spokeo uses this distinction between compensation and deterrence to interpret whether statutory violations are concrete injuries. Violations of deterrent provisions are objective, concrete injuries, while violations of
compensatory provisions are not. Plaintiffs suing under the latter
thus must allege some concrete harm in addition to a bare statutory violation to have standing.
For several reasons, the functional reading is the best interpretation of Spokeo. First, it provides a clear rule on which statutory violations are injuries in fact and which are not, helping to
solve the problems that the courts currently face. That clarity on
how judges will treat statutes will also help legislatures predict
the effect of statutes when enacting them.
Second, the functional reading reflects intuitions about cases.
Generally, it seems that plaintiffs suing under statutes that provide compensation only as an incidental incentive to regulate industries should be able to sue regardless of whether they can
show subjective harm. If the goal of a cause of action is to turn
citizens into private attorneys general that punish all infractions,
whether the particular plaintiff suing felt sad or confused or lost
money as a result of the infraction seems irrelevant. What matters are just the objective facts that the law was violated and that
the law makes that violation actionable.
The reasons why the courts should bar lawsuits for violations
of compensatory statutes when the plaintiff can show no subjective harm are equally clear. For example, there is a federal cause
150 See Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (“Compensation” is defined as
“[p]ayment of damages, or any other act that a court orders to be done by a person who
has caused injury to another. In theory, compensation makes the injured person whole.”).
151 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 (1979) (“‘Compensatory damages’ are the
damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him.”).
152 See generally, for example, Robert G. Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 Harv CR–CL L Rev 83 (1981) (describing and analyzing the
compensation provided by federal fair housing law); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Remedies for Employment Discrimination, archived at https://perma.cc/85QT
-JYXV (“Whenever [employment] discrimination is found, the goal of the law is to put the
victim of discrimination in the same position (or nearly the same) that he or she would
have been if the discrimination had never occurred.”).
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of action compensating for property damage, personal injury, or
death caused by designated acts of terrorism.153 That provision
clearly does not make being targeted by, or even present at, an
act of terrorism a concrete injury; the plaintiff must show some
subjective harm requiring compensation. The functional theory
draws the Spokeo line between statutory violations that are sufficient for standing and those that are not accordingly.
Third, the functional theory follows from Spokeo’s description
of Congress’s role in identifying new concrete injuries. The Court
repeatedly emphasized that Congress’s institutional competence
in identifying concrete injuries gives it a role in determining
which injuries are concrete:
[B]ecause Congress is well positioned to identify intangible
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is [ ] instructive and important. . . . Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” . . .
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.”154
Under the functional approach, after Congress identifies conduct as actionable in a regulatory statute, being faced with that
conduct is itself a concrete injury for purposes of Article III. This
idea reflects that under Spokeo, Congress has not only the power
to make previously recognized injuries actionable, but also the
power to “define injuries . . . that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”155 When Congress creates a new
regulatory cause of action, it does just that: it recognizes that people faced with the conduct it condemns have been wronged to such
a degree that they are entitled to a remedy. Those wrongs are often new, though, in the sense they were not widely recognized
before Congress enacted the standard of conduct or scheme of regulation that they violate. Congress makes these judgments using
its unique positioning as the primary federal overseer of the economy and the law. Recognizing those judgments is exactly what
Spokeo instructs the courts to do.
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See 31 CFR § 50.100.
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (majority), 580 (Kennedy
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
155 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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On the other hand, because compensatory statutes aim to
make people whole for injuries they suffer, they will never justify
liability for someone who cannot allege any subjective harm. Unlike regulatory causes of action, compensatory causes of action do
not identify new injuries previously unrecognized at law, but provide additional remedies for old ones, as subjective harm (or even
a risk of it) has long been recognized as an injury sufficient for
standing.156 In the context of a compensatory statute, if someone
can allege only a “bare procedural violation” that is “divorced from
any concrete harm,” they lack standing.157 In the context of a regulatory cause of action, though, Congress “elevat[es]” the violation itself to the status of a concrete harm.158
Fourth, the functional approach is consistent with, and indeed supported by, the goals of the case-or-controversy requirement articulated in Spokeo. The case-or-controversy requirement
“prevent[s] the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are primarily political in nature”159 and “prevent[s] the judicial process
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”160
Preventing political entanglement is clearly important. For example, it is good that the Court stopped the plaintiff in Lujan from
obtaining a remedy for the Department of the Interior’s allegedly
poor regulation of third parties.161 Because the functional solution
to concreteness keeps the particularization requirement in place,
it will not allow such attempts to be successful. Indeed, it will
minimize entanglement by minimizing judicial second-guessing
of Congress’s decisions regarding which injuries are concrete. For
that reason, my approach also prevents judicial usurpation of
Congress’s Article I powers, the other goal of standing. Under my
approach, the judge’s role is divining the intent and function of
statutes, not making policy decisions.
An objection to the functional reading could be that it removes the role of the courts in ensuring compliance with the case-

156 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (explaining the longstanding recognition of both tangible injuries and intangible ones such as slander).
157 Id.
158 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578.
159 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas concurring).
160 Id at 1547 (majority), quoting Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 568 US 398,
408 (2013).
161 See Lujan, 504 US at 562 (“When, [ ] as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, . . . standing . . . is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”) (emphasis in original), quoting Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 758 (1984).
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or-controversy requirement, undermining the constitutional separation of powers.162 “Congress may not enact a law that eliminates Article III safeguards that permit federal courts only to use
the ‘judicial Power’ to hear ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” 163 However, as the Sixth Circuit said, all that is required to avoid undermining separation-of-powers principles is that there “be some
limits on Congress’s power to create injuries in fact suitable for
judicial resolution.”164
Because the functional approach has a limiting principle and
does not cover all statutorily created causes of action, it complies
with this requirement. When Congress enacts compensatory statutes that logically require a subjective injury for liability, the objective approach does not apply, so judicial checks on standing remain in full force. The judiciary must draw and preserve the line.
For example, Congress cannot call a standard tort statute “regulatory” to avoid standing requirements. Furthermore, the functional approach does not eliminate other limits on standing, like
particularization, actuality, and imminence, that enforce additional ceilings on Congress’s power to define injuries in fact. Thus,
my theory does not eliminate “the line between what Congress
may, and may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact’”; rather, it
explicates where that line lies, an exercise the Sixth Circuit did
not attempt.165 Under it, “Congress may not say that anything is
an injury, and by saying so expect the federal courts to agree,” so
“there [are] some limits on Congress’s power to create injuries in
fact.”166
Fifth, my approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
examples of how to apply Spokeo. The FCRA requires consumer
reporting agencies to give recipients of their reports a summary
of the recipient’s obligations under the Act.167 It also provides a
cause of action for consumers whose FCRA rights are willfully violated.168 The Supreme Court said in Spokeo that showing a violation of the mandatory disclosure provision is not sufficient to
show a concrete harm.169 That example makes perfect sense under

162
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See Hagy, 882 F3d at 623.
Id, quoting US Const Art III, § 2.
Hagy, 882 F3d at 623.
Id.
Id (emphasis in original).
See 15 USC § 1681e(d)(1)(B).
See 15 USC § 1681n.
See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550.
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my theory because the FCRA’s private cause of action is compensatory. The FCRA protects the rights of specific individuals
against inaccurate information by giving them a right to sue.170
Its goal is to ensure that agencies are “fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy,
and proper utilization of [ ] information” about the specific consumer.171 The FCRA’s remedial provisions lack some of the features like enhanced damages for frequent noncompliance, consideration of the defendant’s resources when setting damages,
specific provisions for class actions, and automatic attorney’s fees
for successful plaintiffs that are included in the FDCPA.172 The
FCRA also requires scienter for statutory and punitive damages,
allowing only actual damages otherwise, which distinguishes it
from the FDCPA’s strict-liability, maximum-deterrence approach.173 This suggests that the FCRA creates a regime for compensating individual consumers for individualized harms: when
the defendant’s information about the consumer is accurate, relevant, and properly used, the consumer suffered no harm and
thus does not have standing to seek compensation.
The Spokeo Court next said that “[i]t is difficult to imagine”
how a credit reporter disseminating a wrong zip code, a technical
violation of the FCRA, “could work any concrete harm” without
additional allegations.174 That example perfectly aligns with the
functional approach as applied to the FCRA. Under the functional
approach, because the FCRA is compensatory, a technical violation of it is not a concrete injury.
Finally, one role of standing is to find the “best plaintiff” to
bring the case. A good plaintiff can present the case well and will
aggressively seek relief.175 For the purposes of deterrent statutes,
every plaintiff whose statutory rights are violated is as good as
any other to achieve this policy priority. From an economic standpoint, any such consumer will theoretically be willing and able to
pursue the case regardless of whether they are subjectively
harmed, as the major damages in regulatory statutes are statutorily prescribed and do not depend on subjective harm. Thus,
granting standing to any plaintiff subject to a statutory violation
170

See id at 1545.
15 USC § 1681(b).
172 Compare 15 USC § 1681n, with 15 USC § 1692k. See also Part III.B.
173 See 15 USC §§ 1681n, 1681o(a).
174 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550.
175 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Door: How Your Constitutional
Rights Became Unenforceable 112–13 (Yale 2017).
171
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would contribute to the standing doctrine’s purposes of finding
the best plaintiff. A plaintiff whose rights under a compensatory
statute are violated but who suffers no subjective injury is most
likely not a good plaintiff, though. Because they have no subjective injury, they will likely have minimal damages and thus little
motivation to aggressively pursue the case.
All of these benefits to the functional theory of Spokeo would
be irrelevant, though, if it could not be workably applied to particular causes of action. The power of a theory to persuasively explain examples also increases our confidence in the theory. The
remainder of this Comment thus illustrates an application of the
functional approach to the circuit split on standing under the
mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA. This application
results in the objective approach to FDCPA standing.
B. The Objective Approach: Applying the Functional View of
Spokeo to the FDCPA
This Section applies the functional interpretation of Spokeo
to the FDCPA and argues that, in the FDCPA, Congress chose to
make all violations of the disclosure provisions with respect to
any consumer actionable regardless of whether the plaintiff was
subjectively harmed. The statute’s text, its function in regulating
debt collectors through deterrence rather than providing compensation for subjective suffering, and its legislative history all lend
support to this conclusion. As a result, any plaintiff whose
FDCPA disclosure rights are violated has a concrete injury.
1. The cause of action.
In the operative language creating the FDCPA’s private
cause of action, the Act states that “any debt collector who fails to
comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any
person is liable to such person.”176 The plain meaning of this provision is that no additional subjective element is required, which
is consistent with a noncompensatory function. The word “any” is
repeated three times, after all. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits’
approaches, which effectively read in a subjective element to
standing under the FDCPA, thus implicitly amend the statute in
contravention of its plain text.
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15 USC § 1692k(a).
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The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Hagy might offer a defense of
such judicial amending: it observes that “[n]owhere in the Act (or
for that matter the legislative record) does Congress explain why
the absence of [a disclosure] always creates an Article III injury.”177 In fact, it “did not even try to show” that nondisclosure
always creates an injury.178 But that argument does not work.
First, statutes need not explain why Congress makes the judgments that it does on what should be actionable and what should
not be. Second, the first section of the FDCPA does explain why
nondisclosure is harmful. Congress viewed all violations of the
FDCPA as harms because they are instances of “[a]busive debt
collection practices [that] contribute to” problems such as “personal bankruptcies, [ ] marital instability, [ ] the loss of jobs, and
[ ] invasions of individual privacy.”179 Third, the legislative history
also provides an explanation, as I discuss in Part III.B.4 below.
2. Damages.
The damages provision strongly suggests that the FDCPA’s
role is to regulate and deter an industry, not compensate for subjective harms. While the FDCPA allows plaintiffs to recover “any
actual damage sustained by [a plaintiff] as a result of” violations
of the FDCPA,180 consumers are not limited to actual damages.
Individual plaintiffs and every plaintiff who is a member of a class
can also receive statutory damages.181 Unlike standard compensatory damages, the FDCPA’s statutory damages do not depend
on any showing of subjective harm. Indeed, they will exceed actual damages for all but the rarest plaintiffs.182 This suggests that
like punitive damages, their primary function is to deter violators, not to compensate plaintiffs.183 The deterrent purpose of the
provision is also reinforced by how it sets maximum damages for
177

Hagy, 882 F3d at 622 (emphasis in original).
Id at 623.
179 15 USC § 1692(a).
180 15 USC § 1692k(a)(1).
181 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2).
182 See Beattie v D.M. Collections, Inc, 764 F Supp 925, 927–28 (D Del 1991) (“With
the exception of cases involving egregious and multiple violations, consumers bringing suit
for violation of the FDCPA will ordinarily be able to prove only minimal actual damages.
. . . Congress apparently concluded that the statutory damages . . . would provide incentive
for consumers who could prove only minimal damages to bring suit to enforce the Act.”).
183 See Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich L Rev
1349, 1354 n 17 (2009) (“Consumer-protection statutes, such as the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, frequently provide for the award of statutory damages, which are similar to
punitive damages.”), citing 15 USC § 1692k.
178
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absent class members in proportion to the size of the debt collector—namely, 1 percent of its total net worth.184 It takes more damages to deter a larger defendant, so the FDCPA allows for customization based on the defendant’s size. The instructions to judges
setting statutory damages reinforce the point. In individual actions, judges must consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance” and “the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.”185 For class actions, the court must additionally
consider “the resources of the debt collector,” and “the number of
persons adversely affected.”186 Moreover, defendants may escape
liability altogether if their violations are unintentional and occur
despite reasonable compliance procedures.187 These instructions
make no sense unless they are mechanisms to allow courts to
scale damages for the sake of deterrence. The plaintiff’s subjective
injury is not affected by the defendant’s conduct toward others,
intent, compliance program, or resources, but courts consider
them when setting damages.
3. Administrative enforcement.
In addition to private plaintiffs, various administrative agencies, most notably the FTC and the CFPB, are authorized to enforce the FDCPA.188 The Act thus authorizes both private and governmental enforcement of the same regulations. If the major
function of the FDCPA were to compensate for subjective harms,
the administrative remedy would be out of place. Though administrative agencies can and do seek penalties that provide funds to
consumers, such as refunds, their tools include shutting down
debt collectors, obtaining injunctions, and collecting civil penalties—activities which do not directly compensate for past
harms.189 Moreover, the primary purposes of the agencies as a
184

See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(B).
15 USC § 1692k(b)(1).
186 15 USC § 1692k(b)(2).
187 See 15 USC § 1692k(c).
188 See 15 USC § 1692l.
189 See, for example, Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary of the Federal Trade
Commission, to Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
*1–9 (Feb 13, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/VG7Z-D4T3 (describing the FTC’s enforcement efforts under the FDCPA). Note, though, that both the CFPB and FTC have
mechanisms for giving funds they collect to consumers. The CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund
can disburse to consumers who cannot obtain other compensation for abusive practices,
though it is used only a few times per year. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Civil Penalty Fund, archived at https://perma.cc/7QME-KYDD. The FTC sends the vast
majority of the funds it collects to customers of defendants via refunds. See Federal Trade
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whole are regulatory, not compensatory.190 The strong presence of
administrative remedies suggests that the FDCPA’s role is to regulate the debt collection industry whenever it violates the provisions with respect to any individual, not merely to provide compensation. That supports the argument that Congress chose not
to require a subjective injury for standing under the FDCPA.
In sum, three of the major provisions of the FDCPA—the language authorizing private actions, the damages remedy, and the
administrative remedy—all support the objective approach to
FDCPA standing.
4. Statutory purpose and legislative history.
The statute’s legislative history also supports the proposition
that Congress decided to elevate FDCPA disclosure violations as
objective harms due to the Act’s emphasis on deterrence rather
than compensation.
The FDCPA opens with a statement that its purpose is “to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and
“to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”191 It was motivated by “abundant evidence of the use of
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many
debt collectors.”192 The language is overwhelmingly regulatory
and deterrent in nature, focused on the defendant’s conduct rather than compensating for the plaintiff’s subjective injury.193
The Senate Committee Report on the FDCPA also focused on
regulation of debt collectors. “The committee believe[d] that the
serious and widespread abuses in this area” justified creating federal legislation.194 While the bill included a consumer cause of action in addition to administrative remedies, its purpose was to
make the regulations “primarily self-enforcing; consumers who

Commission Office of Claims and Refunds, Annual Report 2017 *1 (2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/GR2Y-PSX9.
190 See 12 USC § 5491(a) (announcing the creation of the CFPB to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer
financial laws”); Federal Trade Commission, About the FTC, archived at
https://perma.cc/GEP3-BFMF (announcing the FTC’s mission as “[p]rotecting consumers
and competition . . . through law enforcement, advocacy, and education”).
191 15 USC § 1692(e).
192 15 USC § 1692(a).
193 See generally 15 USC § 1692.
194 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, S Rep No 95-382, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 USCCAN 1965, 1967.
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have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance.”195 Enforcing compliance is not the same role as obtaining
compensation, though they may overlap. The Senate envisioned
private plaintiffs not as analogues to tort victims, but as private
enforcers of the law.196 The committee also referred to the bill as
“comprehensive legislation which fully addresses the problem of
collection abuses.”197 The focus was on solving industry abuse.
Similar ideas can be found in the relevant House Committee
Report. The Report introduces the bill as a solution to the lack of
“effective regulation of debt collectors” and the “lawless area”
around debt collection.198 While there is plenty of coverage of the
abuses of debt collectors toward individuals, the statute is undeniably regulatory. For example, it originally included a minimum
recovery of $100 for successful individual FDCPA claims in addition to actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.199 While this
provision was later stripped from the bill, it speaks to the deterrent, as opposed to compensatory, intent of the House.
Therefore, the overall thrust of the statutory purpose and legislative history is toward regulation of the debt collection industry. The creation of a private right of action was merely a convenient way to do it; the contemplated suits had purposes beyond and
independent of individual compensation.
Congress’s concerns about avoiding competitive disadvantages to ethical debt collectors competing with unethical ones
also support omitting a subjective element from concreteness. All
decisions to cut corners by not including disclosures save compliance costs for debt collectors regardless of whether the violations
demonstrably caused a particular plaintiff subjective harm.
Every violation of the statute thus hurts this purpose. Limiting
standing to plaintiffs with subjective injuries would functionally
cabin the scope of the Act and decrease the effectiveness with
which it achieves this purpose.
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Id.
See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Vand L Rev
285, 291 (2016) (“The private enforcement of public law has been a central regulatory
strategy for decades, with historical antecedents tracing back centuries.”) (citations omitted); Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, and Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement,
17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 637, 662–84 (2013) (describing private enforcement regimes, their
costs and benefits, and the legislative choices that must be made when crafting them).
197 S Rep No 95-382 at 6 (cited in note 194).
198 Debt Collection Practices Act, HR Rep No 95-131, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1977).
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One possible objection to this argument is that Congress
could not have intended the absurd result commanded by the objective approach in a case like Hagy, in which the plaintiffs sued
an attorney for not disclosing that he was a debt collector even
though his letter was genuinely helpful to the plaintiffs. In that
case, at least, it seems that there could not be a concrete injury.
But to start with the obvious, a letter that appears on its face to
be harmless might not actually be harmless. Congress wanted all
consumers to be on guard when receiving letters from debt collectors, hence the requirement to disclose that the sender is a debt
collector.200 More fundamentally, there is no justifiable reason to
violate the disclosure requirements of the FDCPA. Every violation undercuts the FDCPA’s regulations and its purposes of preventing unfair competition and establishing norms in the marketplace for debt. After all, the goal in bringing lawyers like the
letter-writer in Hagy into the scope of the FDCPA was explicitly
to keep a uniform floor of permissible debt collector activity, “requiring them to adhere to the standards of conduct that Congress
enacted to govern consumer debt collection activities.”201
Another possible objection arising from the absurdity canon
could be that under the objective approach, any technical violation would be sufficient for plaintiffs to have standing to sue. That
would create practical problems, clogging the courts with suits
over tiny harms. However, litigation will not increase because
compliance costs will be low for ethical collectors. The required
disclosures under the FDCPA are the same in every case. Most
debt collectors simply copy and paste provisions of the statute.202
Because of these low compliance costs, there is no good reason for
a professional debt collector to fail to comply with the FDCPA.
Further, my approach might actually decrease suits in the long
run by making noncompliance more costly than compliance. Holding collectors liable for violations is therefore not absurd, but a
reasonable response to activities that undermine ethical standards in the debt market.
200 For example, helpful-looking letters offering to settle old debt with consumers can
actually be attempts to revive the debt, making it legally valid where it otherwise would not
be. See Pantoja v Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 852 F3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir 2017).
201 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Amendments, HR Rep No 99-405, 99th Cong, 1st
Sess 5 (1985), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1752, 1756.
202 See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F), 84 Fed Reg 23274, 23278 (2019) (“[T]o reduce legal risk, debt collectors typically
use the language of the statute in making required disclosures, even though that language
can be difficult for consumers to understand.”).
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5. Consistency with standing under other FDCPA
provisions.
The objective approach resolves a current tension between
standing under the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure and misrepresentation provisions. When assessing whether debt collectors’
representations violate another FDCPA provision, § 1692e’s ban
on “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s],”203 the federal courts use an objective standard: the least sophisticated consumer. The Second Circuit describes its approach, which is representative, in Arias v Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP:204
We analyze the reasonableness of an interpretation from the
perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, who . . . lacks
the sophistication of the average consumer and may be naive
about the law, but is rational and possesses a rudimentary
amount of information about the world. The standard is objective, pays no attention to the circumstances of the particular debtor in question, and asks only whether the hypothetical least sophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret
the representation in a way that is inaccurate. Employing the
least sophisticated consumer standard ensures the protection
of all consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices.205
The implication of this least-sophisticated-consumer approach is that a letter violates the FDCPA if it would confuse the
hypothetical least sophisticated consumer regardless of whether
the plaintiff was actually confused in the case.206 This objectivity

203

15 USC § 1692e.
875 F3d 128 (2d Cir 2017).
205 Id at 135 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), quoting
Easterling v Collecto, Inc, 629 F3d 229, 234 (2d Cir 2012), Ellis v Solomon & Solomon PC,
591 F3d 130, 135 (2d Cir 2010), and Clomon v Jackson, 988 F2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir 1993).
Note that while not all circuits use the same name for the test, the tests are functionally
the same, including the Seventh Circuit’s. See, for example, Pantoja, 852 F3d at 686 (explaining the “unsophisticated consumer” test which is used “[w]hen handling FDCPA
cases”); Daugherty v Convergent Outsourcing, Inc, 836 F3d 507, 511 n 2 (5th Cir 2016)
(recognizing that the approaches of the circuits are uniform regardless of the different
names given to the tests by the circuits), citing Peter v G.C. Services LP, 310 F3d 344, 348
n 1 (5th Cir 2002). Despite the terminological variation, I will use the term “least sophisticated consumer” universally for consistency’s sake.
206 See, for example, Arias, 875 F3d at 137 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
“its misrepresentations are not actionable because Arias was not actually misled” because
the standard is objective) (emphasis in original); Tsenes v Trans-Continental Credit and
Collection Corp, 892 F Supp 461, 464 (EDNY 1995) (explaining that the plaintiff’s burden
204
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provides benefits for both sides, lowering the burden for plaintiffs
while providing debt collectors a uniform target for what standard of clarity their disclosures must meet.207
In line with this interpretation of the FDCPA, various circuits have held that a plaintiff does not have to show that they
were actually misled to have standing in a misrepresentation action. For example, in Pollard v Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding,208 the defendant argued that a plaintiff alleging misrepresentation lacked standing because she was not actually subjectively
misled.209 Interpreting the FDCPA and its purpose, the First Circuit held that “the FDCPA does not require that a plaintiff actually be confused” and that “the absence of confusion is irrelevant
to the standing inquiry.”210 The objective misrepresentation itself
“comprised an injury attributable to the defendant’s actions.”211
Other courts have adopted similar rationales.212
Analogously, there should be no subjective component to the
injury of failure to disclose. Any other result would create a bizarre inconsistency because the provisions are so similar. First,
the mandatory disclosure and misrepresentation sections of the

in a misrepresentation action only includes showing abuse by the defendant, not any subjective harm to the plaintiff).
207 See Crawford v LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir 2014).
208 766 F3d 98 (1st Cir 2014).
209 Id at 102.
210 Id at 103.
211 Id.
212 See, for example, Tourgeman v Collins Financial Services, Inc, 755 F3d 1109, 1116
(9th Cir 2014):
Although Tourgeman could not have suffered any pecuniary loss or mental
distress as the result of a letter that he did not encounter until months after
it was sent—when related litigation was already underway—the injury he
claims to have suffered was the violation of his right not to be the target of
misleading debt collection communications. The alleged violation of this
statutory right—like those rights at issue in Havens, Robins, and the other
cases that we have noted—constitutes a cognizable injury under Article III.
See also Papetti v Does 1–25, 691 F Appx 24, 26–27 (2d Cir 2017) (holding that misleading
letters are sufficient for standing under Spokeo); Miller v Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321
F3d 292, 307 (2d Cir 2003) (holding the same under Article III pre-Spokeo).
Several district courts have ruled similarly. See Johnson v Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, 325 FRD 608, 611–14 (ND Ind 2018); Patterson v Howe, 307 F Supp 3d 927,
938–39 (SD Ind 2018) (holding that violations of least sophisticated debtor standard create
standing regardless of whether the plaintiff was actually misled); Ceban v Capital Management Services, LP, 2018 WL 451637, *3–4 (EDNY); Balon v Enhanced Recovery Company, Inc, 264 F Supp 3d 597, 608–10 (MD Pa 2017) (holding that misrepresentation was
sufficient for standing under Spokeo even when plaintiff claimed they suffered no other
injury whatsoever in an attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction).

1732

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1695

FDCPA are tightly bundled. For example, one of the major mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA appears in the section
titled “False or misleading representations.”213 Second, both nondisclosure of rights and the misrepresentation of the amount or
nature of a debt are prohibited to prevent debt collectors from
duping consumers on the terms of repayment. Third, both the
misrepresentation and nondisclosure provisions of the FDCPA
primarily deter rather than compensate. The approaches of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, which both require a subjective injury for standing in mandatory disclosure actions in at least some
cases, treat the provisions differently despite their strong textual
and operative similarities.
The Seventh Circuit faced this problem in Casillas and objected that the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is only
used to check whether a letter is misleading; it cannot allow people without subjective injuries to sue.214 However, this objection
mischaracterizes the test. The point of the least-sophisticatedconsumer standard is that it is objective, and violations of it are
sufficient for standing, not just for liability on the merits. While
it is typically used when judging misrepresentation, the arguments above demonstrate the value of consistency in standing
across the FDCPA’s misrepresentation and nondisclosure
provisions.
A critic could object that Spokeo should lead courts to reverse
the precedents holding that violations of the least-sophisticatedconsumer standard are sufficient for standing. As such, alignment with those precedents is a detriment, not a benefit, to my
position. FDCPA standing should be uniform, but it should uniformly require an additional injury beyond a statutory violation.
First, though, Spokeo has not in fact led the courts to abandon
their prior positions on standing for violations of the leastsophisticated-consumer standard.215 Second, such a radical
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15 USC § 1692e.
See Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 n 3.
215 See, for example, Tourgeman, 755 F3d at 1114–18 (holding that a consumer had
standing without additional allegations of harm when a dunning letter violated the leastsophisticated-consumer standard); Balon, 264 F Supp at 608–10 (holding plaintiff had
standing from misrepresentations even when the plaintiff themselves argued they lacked
it and had no actual damages, citing the “overwhelming majority” of district courts assessing such claims post-Spokeo); Thomas v John A. Youderian Jr, LLC, 232 F Supp 3d
656, 671–72 (D NJ 2017) (recognizing that even violations of the least-sophisticatedconsumer standard that are very unlikely to result in a recovery for the plaintiff on the
merits are sufficient for standing); Bautz v ARS National Services, Inc, 226 F Supp 3d
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change would thus require a strong reason behind it. Because my
functional reading of Spokeo demonstrates that Spokeo in fact requires the objective approach that the courts already follow in the
misrepresentation context, the objective approach should be
preserved.
C. The Objective Approach Sets Proper Incentives
In addition to its doctrinal advantages, the objective approach to standing has clear policy benefits: it sets proper incentives for defendants. Because showing standing is necessary to
hold a defendant liable, different approaches to standing doctrine
create different incentives for defendants to abide by statutory
requirements.216 Broadening standing creates more potential liability and thus deters defendants from engaging in potentially actionable activity. Consequently, more restrictive approaches limit
potential defendants’ incentives to abide by the statute.
First, requiring plaintiffs to show that they affirmatively
planned to assert their FDCPA rights but were foiled by nondisclosure, as Casillas did, significantly lowers the probability that
any given FDCPA disclosure violation will be actionable. That
probability will be especially low for people without the income,
education, and social connections which could lead them to understand their rights to dispute their debts. Debt collectors would
thus have fewer incentives to comply with the FDCPA when collecting from vulnerable populations. Such a result is at odds with
contemporary FDCPA doctrine, which attempts to protect unsophisticated consumers.217
Second, any approach with a subjective element will fail to
force defendants to internalize the full legal impact of their noncompliance, as a significant number of injuries will be unrecoverable in principle. Any noncompliance is too much noncompliance
for the primary goal of the FDCPA: the creation of a universal
131, 143–44 (EDNY 2016) (reaching the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit in Tourgeman post-Spokeo).
216 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of Illinois
Brick, 46 U Chi L Rev 602, 608–25 (1979) (analyzing the incentives created by different
approaches to antitrust standing).
217 See, for example, Daugherty, 836 F3d at 511 (explaining the use of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard to fulfill the remedial purpose of the FDCPA). See also
Pantoja, 852 F3d at 684 (mentioning concerns with “opportunities for mischief and deception, particularly when sophisticated parties aim carefully crafted messages at unsophisticated consumers”).
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standard throughout the debt collection industry.218 Courts
should interpret the FDCPA to encourage uniform compliance to
fulfill the statute’s purpose—and leaving violations unaddressed
frustrates this purpose.219
Third, subjective approaches can make liability depend on
whether the plaintiff met finicky pleading standards. For example, Casillas’s case itself was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to plead that she actually read the debt collector’s letter.
Casillas did not plead that she affirmatively did not read the letter; the complaint was merely silent on the matter, but her case
was still dismissed with prejudice.220 While Judge Barrett later
said that Casillas “already knew that she would not dispute her
debt”221 to distinguish the case from another, that assertion is not
supported by the earlier description of the facts, the decision below, or the allegations in the complaint.222 Standing is a technical
doctrine, but it should not be interpreted to create arbitrary barriers to the plaintiff’s day in court.
The objective approach to standing under the FDCPA addresses all of these policy issues. All violations of the FDCPA will
be equally pursuable regardless of whether the plaintiff intended
to pursue their rights, eliminating the incentive to target unsophisticated consumers.223 Moreover, the barriers that standing

218

See Part III.B.4.
One objection to this could be that Congress factored in the standing barrier when
determining the ideal level of penalties for deterrence, so removing the standing barrier
would actually lead to overdeterrence. Given the language of the FDCPA surveyed in
Part III.B.1, though, it is unlikely that Congress envisioned standing being a major obstacle to FDCPA plaintiffs.
220 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 334.
221 Id at 337.
222 See id at 334; Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, 2017 WL 6517568, *2
(SD Ind); Complaint, Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, No 1:16-cv-1774, *2–5
(SD Ind filed July 1, 2016). This makes the decision to dismiss the case with prejudice
mysterious. Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc emphasized this
mystery to argue that the decision may be more radical than it initially appears, as the
problems with Casillas’s complaint could apparently not be solved even with better pleading. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 342 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[S]urely the panel means to do more than alert future plaintiffs in these cases that they
should plead that they would stand on their rights and to highlight the imminent loss of
numerous substantive protections afforded under the Act. A simple amendment to the
complaint would solve that problem.”).
223 There will probably still be some incentive to target unsophisticated consumers
because they are less likely to sue to enforce their rights than more sophisticated consumers, but the objective approach should at least help at the margin.
219
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poses to recovery will be lessened, preventing suboptimal deterrence. Cases will not rise or fall on unusually heightened pleading
standards alone.
D. Applications of the Functional Reading of Spokeo to NonFDCPA Contexts
My solution to the existing circuit split regarding the
FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements flows from the functional reading of Spokeo, which emphasizes the differences between deterrent and compensatory statutes. Similar approaches
can and should be applied to other consumer protection statutes
in other contexts. If a law’s text, function, and purpose support
viewing it as a mechanism for deterrence, violations of it should
be treated as concrete injuries. If they support viewing the law as
compensatory, though, violations of it should not be treated as
concrete injuries, so plaintiffs should have to show an additional
concrete injury to have standing.
Focusing the Spokeo question on regulation versus compensation would help the courts to apply the confusing decision to
other consumer protection statutes. For example, the courts are
currently struggling with distinct disagreements on whether unsolicited cell phone calls and text messages in violation of consumer protection statutes count as “concrete.”224 When resolving
those questions, courts should focus not on the nature of the violation itself, but on the regulatory or compensatory role the statute plays in Congress’s overall statutory scheme. That would lead
to consistency with Spokeo, better outcomes, and fewer metaphysical headaches.
The current uncertainty over Spokeo also makes it difficult
for Congress to determine the scope of standing under any consumer protection statute it passes. My approach would make this
much easier; statutes concerned with regulating industries that
emphasize deterrence and broad liability would create concrete
injuries, while statutes concerned with compensation would not.
The analysis of the FDCPA above provides an example of how
Congress can choose appropriate texts, structures, and purposes
for its statutes to predictably create its desired result and fulfill
its role in determining the concreteness of injuries.

224 See generally, for example, Salcedo v Hanna, 936 F3d 1162 (11th Cir 2019);
Susinno v Work Out World, Inc, 862 F3d 346 (3d Cir 2017).
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CONCLUSION
Courts are currently divided over how to apply the confusing
Spokeo precedent to the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements. This Comment has proposed a novel solution: removing
any subjective harm requirement for standing in mandated disclosure cases. This position is consistent with a new, functional
approach to interpreting Spokeo. It is also mandated by the
FDCPA’s structure and legislative history. The objective approach unifies the standing requirements under the FDCPA’s disclosure and misrepresentation provisions, preventing an odd tension. Finally, limiting standing with a subjective element would
have negative impacts on the incentives of debt collectors, which
this solution avoids. Thus, the courts should adopt the objective
approach.

